

# 2010년 시행 44회 외무고등고시 제2차 시험 (영어)

제공: 정영한 박사 <[www.englishtop.com](http://www.englishtop.com)>

제 1 문. 다음 글을 우리말로 옮기시오.

(총 40점)

1) When does a rising power become a threat? There is seldom a single moment. A century ago, AngloGerman antagonism was still a relatively new phenomenon; an alliance between the two empires seemed plausible as late as 1899. Likewise, the United States took time to identify Japan as a serious rival in the Pacific region; it was not until the 1930s that relations really soured. In both cases, the perception of a strategic threat was slow to grow. But grow it did—and ultimately it led to war. Could the same be happening to the United States and China today? Are we imperceptibly but inexorably slipping from cooperation to competition? Back in early 2007, it seemed as if China and America were so intertwined they'd become one economy: I called it "Chimerica." The Chinese did the saving, the Americans the spending. The Chinese did the exporting, the Americans the importing. The Chinese did the lending, the Americans the borrowing. As the Chinese strategy was based on export-led growth, they had no desire to see their currency appreciate against the dollar. So they intervened consistently in currency markets, and as a result, they now have international reserves totaling \$2.1 trillion. About 70 percent of these are in dollar-denominated securities, and a large proportion of these are in U.S. government bonds. The unintended effect of this was to help finance the U.S. current-account deficit at very low interest rates. Without those low long-term rates, it's hard to believe that the U.S. real estate market would have bubbled the way it did between 2002 and 2007. (20점)

2) Neither biological evolution nor cultural progress follows a continuous curve. Neither of them is strictly cumulative in the sense of continuing to build where the previous generation had left off. To take an example, juvenilization appears to play an important part in the grand strategy of evolution. It involves a retreat from specialized adult forms to earlier, less committed and more plastic stages in the development of organisms—followed by a sudden advance in a new direction. It is as if the stream of life had momentarily reversed its course, flowing uphill for a while towards its original source; then opened up a new stream-bed. In other words, we are faced here with the same pattern of *reculer pour mieux sauter*, 'step back to leap,' which we have encountered at critical turning points in the evolution of science and art. Biological

evolution is to a large extent a history of escapes from the blind alleys of over-specialization, whereas the evolution of ideas is a series of escapes from the tyranny of mental habits and stagnant routines. In biological evolution the escape is brought about by a retreat from the adult to a juvenile stage as the starting-point for the new line; in mental evolution by a temporary regression to more primitive and uninhibited modes of ideation, followed by the creative forward leap. Thus these two types of progress—the emergence of evolutionary novelties and the creation of cultural novelties—reflect the same undoing-redoing pattern and appear as analogous processes on different levels. (20점)

제 2 문. 다음 글을 영어로 옮기시오.

(40점)

현재의 세계 경제 위기는 사실상 지속가능성으로의 전환을 의미하기 때문에, 한 두 해가 아니라 한 세대 동안이나 계속될 것이다. 주요 상품의 부족과 최근 몇 년 동안의 기후변화로 인한 피해가 세계 경제의 불안정을 초래했고 이로 인해 현재의 위기가 야기되었다. 치솟는 식품 가격과 유가 그리고 대규모의 자연 재해는 금융 시장, 가계의 구매력, 심지어는 정치적 안정까지도 악화시켰다. 이러한 관점에서 볼 때, 현재의 위기를 극복하기 위해 선진국과 개발도상국들이 추구해야 할 필수적인 정책은 21세기에 맞는 사회 기반 시설을 건설하는 것이다. 여기에는 재생가능한 에너지를 사용하는 효율적인 전기 공급망 구축, 광대역 인터넷을 제공하는 무선망 구축, 담수를 효율적으로 사용하고 재활용하는 관개 및 하수처리시스템 구축, 도시 간의 대중교통 체계 마련, 그리고 안전한 고속도로 건설 등이 포함된다. 이러한 투자는 세계적인 경기침체의 기저를 이루는 범세계적 소비 지출의 감소를 상쇄시키기 위해 단기적으로 필요하다. 더욱 중요한 것은, 장기적으로도 이러한 체계가 필요하다는 것인데, 68억 명이 북적거리는 세계가 부족한 천연자원을 절약하는 지속가능한 과학기술을 채택하지 않는다면 결코 경제 성장을 유지할 수 없기 때문이다.

제 3 문. 다음은 세계화과정에서 국가의 역할 변화에 대한 글이다. 세계화시대에 국가는 어떠한 역할을 통해 'pivotal institution'으로 존속할 수 있는지 200단어 내외의 영문으로 제시하시오. (20점)

Globalization often leads to the decline in power of national governments. It isn't just individuals and neighbourhood institutions that have felt the impact of de-localization. A major causality of this process has been a decline in the power of national governments to direct and influence their economies. The internationalization of financial markets, of technology and of some manufacturing and services brings with it a new set of limitations upon the freedom of action of nation states. Yet while the influence of nation states may have shrunk as part of the process of globalization, it has not disappeared. Indeed, they remain, in Hirst and Thompson's (1996) words, 'pivotal' institutions.

# 2010년 시행 44회 외무고등고시 제2차 시험 모범 번역 (영어)

제공: 정영한 박사 <www.englishtop.com>

제 1 문.

1) 언제 부상하는 강대국이 위협이 되는가? 그러한 일이 발생하는 단일한 시점이 존재하는 경우는 드물다. 일세기 전, 영국과 독일 사이의 적대감은 여전히 상대적으로 새로운 현상이었다. 두 제국 간의 동맹은 1899년까지만 해도 개연성이 있어 보였다. 이와 마찬가지로, 미국이 일본을 태평양 지역에서 심각한 경쟁국으로 인식하는 데에는 시간이 걸렸다: 양국의 관계가 실제로 경색된 것은 1930년대에 이르러서였다. 이 두 가지 경우에 있어서 전략적인 위협에 대한 인식은 서서히 증가했다. 그러나 이러한 인식은 실제로 증가했고, 궁극적으로 전쟁으로 이어졌다. 이와 같은 경우가 오늘날 미국과 중국 사이에도 발생하고 있는 것일까? 양국은 눈에 띄지 않게 그러나 가차 없이 협력관계에서 경쟁관계로 전략하고 있는가? 2007년 초에는 중국과 미국이 아주 긴밀히 연관되어 있어서 단일 경제로 통합될 것처럼 보였다: 나는 그것을 ‘차이메리카(Chimerica)’라고 불렀다. 중국인들은 저축을 했고 미국인들은 지출을 했다. 중국인들은 수출을 했고 미국인들은 수입을 했다. 중국인들은 돈을 빌려주었고 미국인들은 돈을 빌렸다. 중국의 전략은 수출주도 성장에 기반을 두고 있었기 때문에 중국은 위안화가 달러에 대해 평가절상되기를 바라지 않았다. 그래서 그들은 일관되게 화폐시장에 개입했고 그 결과로 중국은 현재 총 2조 1천억 달러에 달하는 외환보유고를 지니고 있다. 이 중 약 70%는 달러로 액수가 매겨진 증권이고, 이 중 상당량은 미정부 채권으로 되어 있다. 이러한 현상의 의도하지 않은 영향은 아주 낮은 금리로 미국의 경상수지 적자를 메울 자금을 공급하는 데 도움을 주는 것이었다. 이러한 장기저리가 없었다면, 미국의 부동산 시장이 2002년과 2007년 사이에 그랬던 것처럼 거품이 커졌을 것이라고 믿기 어렵다.

<영어 원문 출처>

"'Chimerica' is Headed for Divorce." *Newsweek*, August 31, 2009. Ferguson, Niall

2) 생물학적 진화나 문화적 진보는 둘 다 지속적인 상승곡선을 그리지 않는다. 이전 세대가 남겨 놓은 업적을 이어 받아 지속적으로 발전을 이루어 나간다는 의미에서 보면, 진보가 축적되어 이루어지는 것이지만, 생물학적 진화나 문화적 진보는 둘 다 엄밀한 의미에서 축적되어 이루어지는 것이 아니다. 예를 들어, 유년화(juvenilization)는 진화의 큰 전략에서 중요한 역할을 하는 듯 보인다. 이것은 유기체의 발달에 있어서, 특화된 성년기 형태에서 좀더 초기의, 덜 특화되고 더 유연한 단계로의 후퇴를 수반하는데, 이러한 후퇴 뒤에는 새로운 방향으로의 갑작스런 진보가 이어진다. 이것은 삶의 흐름이 일시적으로 그 경로를 변경하여 삶의 원천을 향해 잠시 상류로 흘러가다가 그 후 새로운 하상(河床)을 여는 것과 같다. 다시 말해, 우리는 여기서 ‘더 잘 도약하기 위해 뒤로 물러선다(reculer pour mieux sauter)’는 같은 패턴을 마주하게 되는 것이다. 이러한 패턴은 우리가 과학과 예술의 점진적 발전에 있어 중대한 전환점에서 마주쳐왔던 것이다. 생물학적 진화는 상당 부분 지나친 특수화라는 막다른 길로부터 탈피해온 역사이다. 반면, 사고의 진화는 정신적인 관성과 정체된 일상의 억압으로부터의 일련의 탈피이다. 생물학적 진화에 있어서의 탈피는 성년기에서 새로운 행로의 출발점으로서 유년기로 후퇴함으로써 이루어진다. 정신적 진화에 있어서는 좀더 초기적이고 억제되지 않은 관념화의 방식으로 일시적으로 후퇴한 뒤 창조적인 도약이 이어짐으로써 이러한 탈피가 이루어진다. 따라서 이 두 가지 종류의 발전(진화에 있어 새로운 것의 출현과 문화에 있어 새로운 것의 창조)은 똑같은 되돌림과 되풀이의 양상을 반영하고 서로 다른 차원에서 이루어지는 유사한 과정으로 보인다.

<영어 원문 출처>

Koestler, Arthur. *Janus: A Summing Up*, Chapter 7. 1978.

## 제 2 문.

Since the current global economic crisis in effect signifies that the world is in transition to sustainability, it will persist not just for one or two years but rather for a generation. Insufficient commodities and the damage caused by climate change over the past few years generated instability in the global economy, which in turn gave rise to the current crisis. Soaring food and oil prices and large-scale natural disasters weakened the financial markets, the purchasing power of households, and even political stability. In this respect, the essential policy that both advanced and developing nations should pursue in order to overcome the current crisis is to establish social infrastructures suitable for the 21st century. These include: the establishment of efficient power grids that use renewable energy; the installation of wireless telecommunications grids that provide broadband Internet services; the construction of irrigation and sewage treatment systems that use fresh water efficiently and then reuse it; the enhancement of inter-city public transit; and the construction of safer highways. These investments are necessary in the short term in order to offset the decrease in consumer spending across the world, which underlies the global economic recession. It is more important to note that these systems are necessary over the long run as well, because unless the world, which is crowded with 6.8 billion people, adopts sustainable scientific technology that conserves insufficient natural resources, it can never maintain economic growth.

## 제 3 문.

In the era of globalization, the power of national governments seems to be weakening, and they are even beginning to appear irrelevant. However, as Hirst and Thompson (1996) argue, nation states are still "pivotal institutions." The pivotal roles that nation states play can be recognized in both the political and economic fields.

Firstly, world politics is not dominated by one global polity but is rather influenced by the interplay of many different nation states. For example, even though countries around the world are facing a common threat of global warming, they have failed to come up with effective joint measures to deal with it. During the 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in 2009, the participant nations failed to reach consensus on specific measures to curb the increase in the mean temperature of the Earth in order to prevent damage by global warming. This failure is attributable to the conflicting interests of the nations. This demonstrates that nation states still play an important role in this globalized world.

Secondly, nation states are pivotal institutions in the international economy. Countries around the world established the World Trade Organization in 1995 with the aim of liberalizing international trade, but the WTO has not weakened the power of national economies. Instead of striving to realize international free trade, national economies are trying to sign more free trade agreements (FTAs) with each other to secure an advantage in the competitive global market. In other words, free trade at the international level is stagnating, while free trade is being promoted through various bilateral agreements between nation states. This indicates that national economies still play a key role in the overall global economy.

In conclusion, despite the apparent success of the efforts to advance globalization, the power of nation states remains intact, and they are still serving as pivotal institutions in international politics and the global economy. True globalization should therefore be based on harmonious relationships among nation states.

# 2010년 시행 44회 외무고등고시 제2차 시험 원문 전문 (영어)

제공: 정영한 박사 <[www.englishtop.com](http://www.englishtop.com)>

## ◆ 영한번역 영어 원문 전문

### "Chimerica" is Headed for Divorce

When does a rising power become a threat? There is seldom a single moment. A century ago, AngloGerman antagonism was still a relatively new phenomenon; an alliance between the two empires seemed plausible as late as 1899. Likewise, the United States took time to identify Japan as a serious rival in the Pacific region; it was not until the 1930s that relations really soured. In both cases, the perception of a strategic threat was slow to grow. But grow it did—and ultimately it led to war. Could the same be happening to the United States and China today? Are we imperceptibly but inexorably slipping from cooperation to competition?

Back in early 2007, it seemed as if China and America were so intertwined they'd become one economy: I called it "Chimerica." The Chinese did the saving, the Americans the spending. The Chinese did the exporting, the Americans the importing. The Chinese did the lending, the Americans the borrowing.

As the Chinese strategy was based on export-led growth, they had no desire to see their currency appreciate against the dollar. So they intervened consistently in currency markets, and as a result, they now have international reserves totaling \$2.1 trillion. About 70 percent of these are in dollar-denominated securities, and a large proportion of these are in U.S. government bonds. The unintended effect of this was to help finance the U.S. current-account deficit at very low interest rates. Without those low long-term rates, it's hard to believe that the U.S. -real-estate market would have bubbled the way it did between 2002 and 2007.

For a time Chimerica seemed like a marriage made in heaven: both economies grew so fast that they accounted for about 40 percent of global growth between 1998 and 2007. The big question now is whether or not this marriage is on the rocks. America's highly indebted consumers just can't borrow anymore. The U.S. savings rate is soaring upward, and U.S. imports from China have slumped, down 18 percent between May 2008 and May 2009. Of course, that doesn't mean the Chinese are going to

stop buying dollars. They dare not allow their currency to appreciate when so many jobs in the export sector are under threat. But it does mean that they are questioning the Chimerica strategy.

It's a bit like one of those marriages between a compulsive saver and a chronic spender. Such partnerships can work for a certain period of time, but eventually the penny-pincher gets disillusioned with the spendthrift. Every time Chinese officials express concern about U.S. fiscal or monetary policy, it reminds me of one of those domestic tiffs in which the saver says to the spender: "You maxed out on the credit cards once too often, honey."

Let's look at the numbers. China's holdings of U.S. Treasuries rose to \$801.5 billion in May, an increase of 5 percent from \$763.5 billion in April. Call it \$40 billion a month. And let's imagine the Chinese do that every month through this fiscal year. That would be a credit line to the U.S. government of \$480 billion. Given that the total deficit is forecast to be about \$2 trillion, that means the Chinese may finance less than a quarter of -total federal-government borrowing—whereas a few years ago they were financing virtually the whole deficit.

The trouble is that the Chinese clearly feel they have enough U.S. government bonds. Their great anxiety is that the Obama administration's very lax fiscal policy, plus the Federal Reserve's policy of quantitative easing (in layman's terms, printing money), are going to cause one or both of two things to happen: the price of U.S. bonds could fall and/or the purchasing power of the dollar could fall. Either way the Chinese lose. Their current strategy is to shift their purchases to the short end of the yield curve, buying Treasury bills instead of 10-year bonds. But that doesn't address the currency risk. In a best-selling book titled *Currency Wars*, Chinese economist Song Hongbing warned that the United States has a bad habit of stiffing its creditors by letting the dollar slide. This, he points out, is what happened to the Japanese in the 1980s. First their currency strengthened against the dollar. Then their economy tanked.

What is China's alternative if it seeks a divorce from America? Call it the empire option. Instead of continuing in this unhappy marriage, the Chinese can go it alone, counting on their growing economic might (according to Goldman Sachs, China's gross domestic product could equal that of the United States by 2027) to buy them global power in their own right. In some ways they've already begun doing this. Their naval strategy clearly implies a challenge to U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. Their investments in African minerals and infrastructure look distinctly imperial too. And now the official line from Prime Minister Wen Jiabao is to "hasten the implementation of our 'going out'

strategy and combine the utilization of foreign exchange reserves with the 'going out' of our enterprises." That sounds like a Chinese campaign to buy up foreign assets—exchanging dodgy dollars for copper mines.

At the same time, crucially, the Chinese need to have their own domestic consumers step up to take the place of over leveraged Americans. China's economy is, above all, a manufacturing concern; if no one is going to the shopping malls, China's companies are just building their inventories. So a post-Chimerican China needs to be not only an empire, but also a consumer society. This will boost China's internal market as well as trade with its Asian neighbors, and will spur the development of an Asian economic bloc.

The global implications of this divorce are huge. Imagine a new Cold War, but one in which the two superpowers are economically the same size. Or, if you prefer an older analogy, imagine a rerun of the Anglo-German antagonism of the early 1900s, with America in the role of Britain, and China in the role of imperial Germany. This is a better analogy because it captures the fact that a high level of economic integration does not necessarily prevent the growth of strategic rivalry and, ultimately, conflict.

We are a very long way from outright warfare, of course. The tectonic plates of geopolitics don't move that fast. But the danger signs are there. In a succession of official and semi-official statements, Chinese spokesmen have signaled their interest in a substitute for the dollar in the form of International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights, or even gold. At the very least, a gradual increase in the share of euros and yen in Chinese reserves must surely be in the cards. But they could go further than that. It's not impossible that, at some point within the next five to 10 years, the Chinese will feel ready to remove their capital controls and allow their own currency, the renminbi, to develop as a freely convertible international currency. At that point, the Chimerican marriage will be over. Not too surprising, really. As the name implied, such an unbalanced relationship was always something of chimera.